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1. WEINSTEIN’S THEORY OF WARRANT AND THE MODEL OF EMERGING TRUTH
(MET)
The primary aim of Weinstein’s paper is to show that the Model of Emerging Truth
(MET) is an effective method for evaluating arguments across a wide range of
argument domains. Weinstein hopes such a display will pique the interests of
argumentation theorists who might otherwise be skeptical or dismissive of the MET
because of its grounding in the logic of entailment. (Weinstein, 2013, p. 2) While I
confess to having only a vague and superficial understanding of the details of the
MET (for I lack the higher level of mathematical and logical competence needed to
study the model thoroughly), the pragmatist nature of both the MET and
Weinstein’s broader theory of warrant merit more attention that they appear to
have received.
The MET takes the methods and results associated with physical chemistry
as paradigmatic of theoretical or argumentative warrant, a fact that may provide
some “insights into the logic or argument evaluation in general.” (Weinstein, 2009,
p. 1) Put crudely, the MET is Weinstein’s attempt to construct a theory of warrant
grounded in key, nomothetic features of the logic of entailment. Taking his cue from
David Hitchcock, Weinstein interprets warrants as “substantive generalizations”
that function “by generalizing over content expressions of whatever logical type,”
(Weinstein, 2009, p. 4) The connection between warrant and explanation outlined
here harkens back to C.S. Peirce’s nomothetic or merenomic account of explanation,
where to explain something is to bring the thing being explained under a higher,
more general principle or rule (Hookway, pp. 266-267), a process that, for Peirce,
was expressive of a fundamental principle of thought best characterized as the
reduction to unity. (Peirce, 1867, pp. 1-3) Weinstein also sees explanation and
warrant as inherently reductive, with the reduction being of a nomothetic order, i.e.
a reduction to a higher level of generality. Thus, warrant is taken be directly
proportional, at least in part, to the comprehensiveness or breadth of an argument
or theory: the greater the breadth of the argument or theory, the greater its warrant.
Hence the warrant of arguments or theories will be a function, at least in part, of
their generality and breadth.
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Another key ingredient in Weinstein’s theory of warrant is argumentative
depth. Here warrant is taken to be directly proportionate to the depth of an
argument or theory, where depth refers to the extent to which a given argument or
theory is “supported by underlying theories, that are reduction progressive.”
(Weinstein, 2009, p. 4) Put crudely, the deeper the chain of interconnecting theories
compatible with an argument or theory (i.e. the deeper its theoretical roots if you
will), the stronger the warrant for the argument or theory in question.
The final element in Weinstein’s theory of warrant is the requirement that
the breadth and depth of an argument or theory increase over time. Here again we
find an interesting parallel with Peirce’s claim that breadth and depth can increase
conversely in what he calls a growing state of Information (thereby falling outside
Kant’s law regarding the inverse proportionality of breadth and depth). (Peirce W1,
pp. 464-465; W2, pp. 76-86; 1867, p. 10) In summary, the key elements of
Weinstein’s theory of warrant are: 1) “consilience, the adequacy of empirical
descriptions over time; breadth, the scope of theories as applied to a range of
empirical descriptions and generalizations; and depth, a measure of the levels of
theoretic redefinitions each one of which results in increasing breadth and higher
levels of consilience.” (Weinstein, 2013, p. 2)
As Weinstein is right to emphasize, one of the more important features of the
MET is its dynamic, adaptive, pragmatist character. Though it appeals to key
features associated with the logic of entailment, the MET is fundamentally a
posteriori in its applications and functions, with the ultimate ground of argument
warrant being the accumulating, empirical evidence of experience broadly
understood. (Weinstein, 2009, p. 3) Hence Weinstein’s reference to the MET as a
model of emerging truth, for warrant ultimately rests upon a theory’s or argument’s
ability to hold up under the weight or force of experience over time, a notion that
harkens back again to Peirce’s pragmatist account of truth as that which will prevail
against the test of experience in the long run. (Peirce, 1868, p. 52; 1877, pp. 120123) In this spirit, the MET does not rank arguments in absolute terms as right or
wrong, but ranks them in more relative terms as having more or less warrant. Such
ranking is in keeping with the situational, adaptive nature of inquiry and the
increasing state of Information associated with an evolutionary, emergent idea of
truth.
Weinstein’s application of the MET to arguments relating to scientific racism
is clear, thorough, and highly convincing. He shows how the various arguments put
forward in support of scientific racism have relatively low warrant when measured
against the three inter-related criteria of breadth, depth, and consilience associated
with the MET. (Weinstein, 2013, pp. 5-9)
2. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
There are good reasons for taking physical chemistry as the paradigmatic model of
argumentative or theoretical warrant. First, as Weinstein rightly points out, physical
chemistry stands as a prime example of the reduction of a wide variety of
phenomena to an explanatorily and epistemologically powerful overarching theory.
(Weinstein, 2013, p. 7) I would add, secondly, that chemical elements and relations
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are also sufficiently stable, broadly speaking, as to make them highly amenable to
mathematical forms of expression. Put simply, chemical phenomena seem to exhibit
a strength and stability of connection that closely mirrors the kinds of strong, logical
connections found within the logic of entailment. Thus the structural/syntactical,
processional/procedural resemblances between chemical phenomena and the logic
of entailment make chemical phenomena highly amenable to the kind of
metamathematical modeling expressed in the MET.
Now I suspect that it is precisely at this point that many argumentation
theorists might begin to feel a little uncomfortable, perhaps even squeamish, for
they could rightly point out that argumentation ranges over an extremely wide
variety of phenomena, few of which have the kinds of elemental and relational
stability found in physical chemistry (e.g. ethics, politics, etc.). They could also
rightly point out that argumentation takes a wide variety of forms, schemes, styles,
and so on, few of which have the same level or kind of connective strength found
within the logic of entailment. Such suspicions might be expressed in the following
way: 1) the MET presumes that all phenomena are reducible to the kinds of strong,
stable, nomothetic relations expressed within physical chemistry, and 2) the MET
presumes that all forms of argumentation are reducible to the logic of entailment.
The main problem with these kinds of criticisms, at least as I understand
them, is quite simply that they miss the point. Though it draws upon key elements
found within physical chemistry and the logic of entailment, the MET does not
reduce all phenomena to the kinds studied within physical chemistry, nor does it
reduce all arguments to the logic of entailment. The MET is a method for evaluating
warrant, and physical chemistry and the logic of entailment stand merely as
paradigmatic examples or illustrations of theories or arguments that have a
particularly strong, paradigmatic or exemplary level of warrant. Understood in this
sense, Weinstein’s description of his theory of warrant as a “metamathematical
model of emerging truth” is perhaps not only misleading, but distracting as well, for
it draws attention away from the theory’s rich, pragmatist nature.
First, I would humbly suggest that the MET should not be viewed solely as a
method for evaluating arguments, but should also be viewed as a method for
evaluating theories, positions, or standpoints as well. To oversimplify somewhat,
when arguments are employed as part of a process of inquiry or discovery then the
MET can serve as a method of evaluating arguments, but when arguments are
employed as part of a process of justification, then the MET is better seen as
evaluating the theory, position, or standpoint for which particular arguments are
employed. This suggests that the scope of the MET may actually be broader than
Weinstein purports.
Second, I also want to suggest that the most salient feature of Weinstein’s
theory of warrant and the MET is not its metamathematical relation to the logic of
entailment, but its pragmatist character. The great insight underlying the MET, as I
see it, is the fundamentally pragmatist idea that the warrant of arguments or
theories is a function, at least in large part, of their fecundity or, as Peirce might put
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it, their uberty.1 Thus the main insight underlying the MET is that a high level of
fecundity or uberty is a strong mark in favor of an argument or theory. We see this
in a number of Weinstein’s more salient observations:
Distinguishing generalities that are imposed on incomplete data from generalities
that are supported by increasing bodies of evidence is what the notion of model
chain progressive attempts to capture. It is not enough that a warrant is supported
by evidence. The evidence must be increasingly adequate to the warrant and
increasingly many chains of increasingly adequate evidence point to the
epistemological power of the warrant in its logical force in supporting inference.
[emphasis mine] (Weinstein, 2013, p. 4)

And again,
It is the perspective of the MET that such rich descriptions, however essential in the
understanding of human culture, are preliminary and that the adequacy of
anthropological understanding requires that generalizations by [sic] put forward
and tested by their ability to warrant increasingly adequate descriptions of the
phenomena. Such generalizations determine competing theoretic perspectives. The
MET attempts to offer an indication as to how such competing perspectives may be
evaluated. The view put forward is that generalizations take their strength from the
breadth and depth with which they connect networks of explanatory structures.
(Weinstein, 2013, p. 4)

Expressed in slightly different terms, the MET plays upon the Peircean-styled insight
that the warrant of an argument or theory is proportionate to its capacity to adapt
and grow as a reliable and effective guide to conduct within an ever-evolving state of
Information (where conduct includes not merely the sphere of practical action, but
of thought as well).2 The idea that an argument or theory should be adaptive,
exhibiting the primary features of growth, is a fundamental principle of Peircean
pragmatism, for argumentation is itself part of an evolutionary process to which it
must become increasingly well adapted (i.e. increasingly truthful). While Weinstein
interprets the emergent nature of truth in epistemic terms, his theory of warrant as
well as the MET are both compatible with the kind of ontological or metaphysical
account of emergent truth expressed within Peirce’s work. One of Peirce’s great
insights was that if we are to take the idea of evolution seriously, then it follows
logically that if forms of argumentation and inquiry are to be effective guides for
conduct, they should continuously adapt and re-adapt themselves to the unrelenting
pressures of experience. The most logically and evolutionarily favored forms of
argumentation (i.e. those with the greatest warrant) will be those that serve as
reliable guides to conduct in the long run, and the best measure of such
effectiveness is the capacity for an argument or theory to adapt and grow in the face
of experience (i.e. become increasingly truthful).3 The great virtue of the MET is that
For more on the idea of uberty in Peirce’s work see, “An Essay toward Improving Our Reasoning in
Security and in Uberty” (1913).
1

For more on the idea that conduct extends to thought as well as practical action, see Peirce (1906),
“The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences, pp. 386-287.
2

3

This is one of the main points underlying Peirce’s famous paper, “The Fixation of Belief.”
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it serves as a pragmatically grounded means for measuring the fecundity or uberty
of an argument or theory. While my capacity to articulate the details of Weinstein’s
account may be limited, all indications are that the MET is a rich, highly adaptive,
fecund model whose dynamic life, simplicity, and beauty merit more considered
attention than it has received.
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